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NOTES
PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS AFTER PERRY EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION v. PERRY LOCAL EDUCATORS' ASSOCIATION-A
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO CLAIMS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT ACCESS TO PUBLICLY OWNED PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION
The right to use public property for public speech is not absolutely
protected by the first amendment.' The extent of the first amendment
protection varies with the character of the property to which speakers
seek access.2 Property well suited to public speech is deemed a "public
forum."3 Because public forum status is central to the rights available to
an aspiring speaker, legal tools for identifying such fora must be clearly
and fuly developed. Unfortunately, they are not.4
Recently, the Supreme Court tried to clarify the public forum doc-
trine,5 but its restatement of the law seems to have left basic questions
unanswered6 and lower courts confused.7 This Note proposes a concep-
tual approach to determining whether a particular place is a public fo-
1. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439,
3448 (1985) ("Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access
to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of government prop-
erty .... "); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 129 (1981) ("[Tlhe First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply
because it is owned or controlled by the government."); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
836 (1976) ("The guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant 'that people who
want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so... wherever
they please.' ") (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972) (Nobody "has an absolute constitutional right to
use [public school property] for his unlimited expressive purposes.").
Even where the first amendment guarantees access, the speaker's activities are subject
to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. See, eg., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 115 (1972); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 688-91 (1978).
2. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
3. This term was begotten in a seminal essay by Professor Kalven, The Concept of
the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. Justice Marshall was the first
Supreme Court Justice to use the term in this context. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 573 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Farber & Nowak, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication,
70 Va. L. Rev. 1219, 1221-22 & n.15 (1984) (using computers to find the word "forum"
preceded by the word "public" in two non-first amendment Supreme Court cases from
the 1960's); Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly
Owned Property, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 121, 123 & n.10 (1982) (deriving from LEXIS informa-
tion that the Supreme Court first used the term as a substantive term of limitation in
1974).
4. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
5. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
6. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 75, 81-94 and accompanying text.
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rum. Part I of this Note highlights the historical development of the
public forum concept. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's recent pro-
nouncements on the law of public fora. Part III discusses the resultant
confusion in the lower courts. Part IV proposes a conceptual formula for
identifying traditional public fora.
I. HISTORY
The public forum concept is rooted in history.8 Over ninety years ago,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking through then-
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes imposed upon streets and parks a type of
first amendment martial law.9 In dismissing a constitutional attack on a
criminal statute forbidding speech on the Boston Common without a per-
mit, Holmes observed: "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally
to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an in-
fringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
private house to forbid it in his house."10 The Supreme Court in Davis v.
Massachusetts" unanimously affirmed." Mr. Justice White wrote: "The
right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes the au-
thority to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed
of, as the greater power contains the lesser."'
3
Today, analysis of an issue of unquestionably constitutional dimen-
sions by resort to the common law of real property seems misplaced. At
the turn of the century, however, it was not unusual because the first
amendment had not yet been held to apply to the states through the four-
teenth.' 4  Not until 1939 was Justice Holmes' property analysis
questioned. 's
In Hague v. C.I.0. ,,6 Justice Roberts invoked some property law of his
own to rescue the streets and parks.
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemo-
rially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. Th[is] privilege. . . must
8. For a more detailed analysis of the history of the public forum concept, see
Kalven, supra note 3, at 1-3, 12-21; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 236-45.
9. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S.
43 (1897).
10. Id. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113.
11. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 48.
14. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); L. Tribe, supra note 1, at 612.
15. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
16. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.",
Justice Roberts, through the common law notions of adverse posses-
sion and trusts, raised the issue to the constitutional level of "privileges
and immunities" protected by the fourteenth amendment."8
Despite the stark clash of the two opinions, Hague did not overrule
Davis.'9 References to Davis or its reasoning in subsequent cases attest to
its continuing vitality.20 As shall be seen, for certain types of property,
the Davis reasoning lives today.2 Hague did, however, carve out from
the Davis reasoning a clear exception for "streets and parks."' During
the decade after Hague, the Court consistently invalidated statutes re-
stricting speech in streets and parks 2 3 These cases, protecting access to
the streets and parks for speech purposes, were the seeds of the public
forum doctrine.2 4
Since 1960, virtually every form of public property has been the sub-
ject of public forum litigation. These have included: places valued by
speakers for their symbolic "backdrops," such as military bases' and
nuclear power plants;2 6 places which themselves served as channels of
17. Id. at 515-16. This passage has come to be the cornerstone of the public forum
doctrine. See Kalven, supra note 3, at 13-15; Stone, supra note 8, at 238-39. It has been
quoted in 43 federal court opinions since 1939. See LEXIS Genfed library, Courts file
(author's calculations) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review).
18. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). As Professor Kalven put it,
this recognized "a kind of First-Amendment easement" in streets and parks. Kalven,
supra note 3, at 13.
19. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("We have no occasion to determine
whether ... the Davis case was rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it rules the
instant case."). But see In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 849 n.4, 434 P.2d 353, 355 n.4, 64
Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 n.4 (1967) (asserting that Hague did overrule Davis).
20. Davis was cited without disapproval in several cases through the 1940's and
1950's. See, eg., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 68-69 (1953); Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U.S. 268, 279 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558, 561 n.2 (1948).
The current version of the Davis reasoning reads: "The State, no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated." Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). This formu-
lation of the Davis reasoning has pervaded public forum cases through the 1970's and
1980's up to Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448
(1985). Compare the quoted phrase with Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897)
("[The State] may ... limi[t] the public use to certain purposes.") (quoting Common-
wealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895)).
21. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
22. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-17 (1939).
23. See, eg., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
24. See Kalven, supra note 3; Stone, supra note 8, at 239-41.
25. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Flower v. United States, 407 U.S.
197 (1972).
26. See Knolls Action Project v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 771 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir. 1985).
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communication, such as theaters,27 mailboxes28 and publications; 29 pub-
lic office buildings; 30 and places used in connection with everyday travels,
including bus3 and rail terminals, 32 airports3 3 and parking lots.34
The judiciary lacked experience with such diverse properties under the
public forum concept. The courts tried to analogize to-or distinguish
from-the "streets and parks" cases.35 But no coherent principles of
analogy ever emerged.36 The public forum concept was stretched beyond
recognition and became incapable of consistent application. The
Supreme Court most recently restated the law of public fora in Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association.37 Unfortu-
nately, Perry has only compounded the confusion.
II. CURRENT LAW
In Perry, a public school system had a policy of granting the incum-
bent labor union access to teachers' mailboxes while denying similar ac-
27. See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); see also Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting facilities).
28. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983);
Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976).
29. See Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978); see also Lee v.
Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F.
Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
30. See, e.g., New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d
718 (2d Cir. 1984) (welfare office); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319
(2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968); see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (interi-
ors of public buses).
32. See, e.g., Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,
745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984) (subway station); Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d
67 (2d Cir. 1977) (same); Moskowitz v. Cullman, 432 F. Supp. 1263 (D.N.J. 1977)
(same); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (railway
station).
33. See, e.g., United States S.W. Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982). For a compilation of district court airport
cases, see Southwest Africa, 708 F.2d at 764-65.
34. See, e.g., Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
35. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471,
480 (2d Cir. 1976); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968); United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359, 1361
(W.D.N.C. 1977); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 851, 434 P.2d 353, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr.
97, 100 (1967).
36. The cases that explicitly analogized to streets and parks typically mentioned a
characteristic or two that streets and parks did or did not have in common with the
property at issue. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538
F.2d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 1976) (mailboxes do not resemble thoroughfares); Moskowitz v.
Cullman, 432 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (D.N.J. 1977) (subway terminal is used by thousands
of travelers each day).
37. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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cess to the rival union.3" The rival union claimed a violation of its first
amendment rights,39 insisting that the mailboxes were public fora." The
Supreme Court held that the mailboxes were not public fora4' and took
the opportunity to restate the law of public fora in dictum.42
Writing for the Court, Justice White established three categories of
public property: public forum by tradition; public forum by designation;
and nonpublic forum.43 Each category has a definition and receives a
corresponding level of judicial scrutiny for restrictions on access to its
property for speech purposes.
The first two categories contain public fora. The first, traditional pub-
lic forum, comprises streets and parks.' Restrictions on access to these
properties come under strict judicial scrutiny.45 If the restrictions are
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, they are uncon-
stitutional." The second, public forum by designation, encompasses
those public properties that the state has dedicated primarily as sites for
communicative activity.47 These include auditoriums, meeting facilities
and theaters.48 Second category properties enjoy the same strict scrutiny
protection as properties in the first category. 49
The third category is defined as "property which is not by tradition or
designation a forum for public communication."5 Thus, all public prop-
erty not included in the first two categories falls, by default, into the third
category. Restrictions on access to third category properties will be up-
held if they are simply "reasonable."51 "[Tihe State may reserve the fo-
rum for its intended purposes. . . as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view."52 This standard can be viewed as the
current incarnation of the Davis reasoning 3 with two added require-
ments: reasonableness and a proscription on de jure viewpoint discrimi-
nation. Neither requirement substantially limits restrictions of access.
Reasonableness is the most relaxed standard of judicial scrutiny.' In-
38. Id. at 39-41.
39. Id. at 41.
40. See id. at 44-48.
41. See id. at 53. The Court also rejected the rival union's equal protection claims
under the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 54-55.
42. See id. at 45-46.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 45.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 46.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Indeed, the section discussing the third category ends with the phrase quoted in
supra note 18.
54. See L. Tribe, supra note 1, at 994-98.
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deed, since Perry, no restriction of access to a nonpublic forum has ever
been held unreasonable. 5 The weakness of the ban on viewpoint dis-
crimination in third category properties is evident from the Court's use
of the word "merely" emphasized in the quoted passage.56 It follows
from the passage that the Court would tolerate viewpoint discrimination
so long as it is not the only justification for the restriction. Indeed, this
appears to be what happened to the rival labor union in Perry. As the
dissent noted, the school's policy of exclusive access to the mailboxes for
the incumbent labor union "amounts to viewpoint discrimination."57
The majority explicitly stated that this kind of discrimination is permissi-
ble in third category properties. "Implicit in the concept of the nonpub-
lic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject
matter and speaker identity. 58
Because property designations within the Perry framework will deter-
mine what access restraints courts will tolerate, it is crucial that the first
two categories be readily recognizable and clearly defined. Unfortu-
nately, the definition of the first category is not clearly developed. The
second category, however, is adequately defined, and a comparison of the
two definitions will help clarify the first category's shortcomings.
The Court introduces the second category with a conceptual formula
by which it can be readily recognized. "A second category consists of
public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity."'59 Although this characterization leaves
some latitude for interpretation, it is at least an attempt to formulate an
abstraction, a general theory of the second category. This sort of gener-
alization is needed if the category is to be useful in applying judicial stan-
dards to the vast array of factual situations that give rise to public forum
litigation.
By contrast, the first Perry category offers no conceptual formula.60
First category properties are described as "quintessential" and "tradi-
55. For an example of deference to those promulgating restrictions on nonpublic fora,
see Low Income People Together, Inc. v. Manning, 615 F. Supp. 501, 518 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (requiring "convincing evidence" of unreasonableness). For a discussion of the
vast discretion vested in the officials who govern nonpublic fora, see Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3451-52 (1985). But see Pre-
ferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1409 (9th Cir.)
(while rejecting the argument that public utility poles are public fora, the court held that
the granting of franchised monopolies to single cable television operators is unreasonable
because it amounts to impermissible viewpoint discrimination), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
380 (1985).
56. See supra text accompanying note 52.
57. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 63, 64 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 49.
59. Id. at 45. Strictly speaking, the second category does not ensure access to prop-
erty for speech purposes; by definition, property dedicated to expressive activity assumes
access by someone. Rather, the protections afforded properties in this category work to
subject speech restrictions to strict scrutiny, thereby ensuring equality of access.
60. See id.
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tional" public fora.61 Beyond these simple modifiers, the Court offers no
characteristics inherent in first category properties. This is one of the
category's major shortcomings. It leaves the lower courts without a con-
ceptual method for determining the presence of first category public fora.
The first category does come with a rather brief list of kinds of proper-
ties included in it--"streets and parks."'62 The first category thus re-
stricts the public forum concept to its narrow roots. 63 The brevity of the
list, however, demonstrates a second shortcoming of this category: it
fails to treat the extensions of the public forum concept developed by the
courts in the years since Hague." Since the early "streets and parks"
cases, courts have extended the public forum concept by analogy leading
to the use, in this connection, of the phrase "streets, parks and other
similar public places." 65 Recently, the Supreme Court has used these
terms.66 Even the brief for the incumbent labor union in Perry quoted
this phrase. 67 Viewed in this light, the absence in the first category of the
phrase "and similar public places" is a glaring omission. It calls into
question the status of many types of public property previously held to
have been public fora.68
Streets and parks are the only public areas specifically enumerated in
the first Perry category. This brief enumeration is all the Supreme Court
has expressed about the first category. The omission from the first cate-
gory of a descriptive formula or even the elastic phrase "and similar pub-
lic places" has worked to undermine the weight of the pre-Perry lower
court law. Types of property long held to have been public fora have,
61. See id.
62. Id. The list was soon expanded to include sidewalks. See United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
63. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
The Court predicates its list for the first category on Justice Roberts' famous passage
from Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939), which it reprints in part. See id.
64. See cases cited in supra notes 30-34.
65. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471,
480 (2d Cir. 1976); Mosley v. Police Dep't, 432 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd,
408 U.S. 92 (1972); United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359, 1361
(W.D.N.C. 1977).
66. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976) (quoting Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968), over-
ruled on other grounds, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)); see also Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) ("park, street comer, or other public
thoroughfare").
67. See Brief for Petitioner at 14 n. 16, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
68. See, e.g., Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1977) (subway
station); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.) (air-
port), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d
1319 (2d Cir.) (welfare office building), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Wolin v. Port of
N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.) (bus terminal), cert denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968);
United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (public parking
lots). These places do not seem to fall into either the first or second category. Yet they
have all been held to be public fora.
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since Perry, been relegated to the third category by some courts.6 9 Other
courts have reached different results."0 The next section samples some of
this conflict.
III. SOME PROBLEMS
A case illustrating the problems of post-Perry analysis is A CORN v.
City of Phoenix.7 ' In Phoenix, the property whose use was in dispute was
the intersection of two streets.72 The "speakers" approached cars
stopped at a traffic signal to address the driver.73 Public authorities con-
sidered this behavior hazardous and imposed an outright ban on solicita-
tion at intersections.74 The district court upheld the restrictions as a
constitutionally permissible regulation of first amendment rights.75
It is not the result that is troubling about Phoenix, but rather its rea-
soning. Soliciting contributions from drivers stopped at traffic lights may
not be a reasonable manner in which to exercise first amendment rights
in the street. Thus, the ordinance could have been viewed as a proper
"time, place and manner" regulation. 6 The court, however, chose not to
view it this way. Instead, the court applied a Perry analysis 77 and held
that intersections of two streets are third category properties. 7  This
holding, of course, easily validates the ordinance. But it also has the
effect of allowing restrictions that distinguish among speakers "on the
basis of subject matter and speaker identity."' 79 Furthermore, the hold-
ing removes intersections from the protections of strict judicial scrutiny.
The Phoenix holding is unfortunate and defective for at least two rea-
sons. First, it is logically indefensible: How can the confluence of two
first category properties constitute a third category property? Second,
the holding creates within streets a subcategory, intersections, which it
then neglects to define.80 Must speakers in the streets be on guard not to
approach intersections lest they be stripped of their constitutional right
69. See infra notes 77, 83 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 77, 84-93 and accompanying text.
71. 603 F. Supp. 869 (D. Ariz. 1985).
72. Id. at 870.
73. Id.
74. The city ordinance provides: "No person shall stand on a street or highway and
solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions from the occupant of
any vehicle." Id. At the time of the dispute Phoenix had no specific ordinance governing
this activity. The ordinance quoted above was adopted just prior to trial. See id.
75. See id. at 871.
76. In United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1980), a similar
ordinance, the one on which the Phoenix ordinance was based, was upheld as a valid
time, place and manner restricition. See id. at 687-88; see also Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-50 (1981); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
77. See ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. 869, 870-71 (D. Ariz. 1985).
78. See id. at 871. Contra ACORN v. City of New Orleans, 606 F. Supp. 16, 20 (E.D.
La. 1984) (intersection held to be traditional public forum).
79. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
80. Close examination shows no correlation between the court's subcategory of "in-
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to a forum? Of course not. Yet this would be the consequence of the
Phoenix holding. Phoenix is an instance of resort to the convenient third
category for want of conceptual standards for determining the applicabil-
ity of the first category.
Another apparent misapplication of the Perry categories appears in the
Second Circuit case of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Ina v.
Metropolitan Transportation Authority.8 In terse dictum,"2 with dubious
support, 3 the court decreed that "[t]he public areas of the MTA [sub-
way] stations are in the third [Perry] category."" This view conflicts
with most prior case law. In an earlier case, Wright v. Chief of Transit
Police, 5 the Second Circuit held the government to a "compelling inter-
est" standard to justify a ban on speech in subway public areas.8 6 This is
tantamount to holding that subway public areas are first category public
fora.87 In Moscowitz v. Cullman,81 the court, after quoting Justice Rob-
erts's famous passage from Hague,89 stated flatly that "the PATH [sub-
way] terminal is a public forum."9 Other courts substantially agree,
drawing analogies between subway stations and public streets.
tersections" and the language of the ordinance. See ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F.
Supp. 869, 870-71 (D. Ariz. 1985).
81. 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
82. The court devoted only one sentence to the issue. See id. at 773.
83. The court's citation reads: "See U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cul-
tural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 764-66 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Southwest Africa)
(holding public areas of airport in third category); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619,
626 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1395
(1982)." Gannett, 745 F.2d at 773. Neither Southwest Africa nor Fernandes holds that
public areas of airport are nonpublic fora. It is almost impossible to interpret them as
doing so.
In Southwest Africa, the court reversed the district court's holding that the public areas
of an airport "constituted a 'nonforum.'" Southwest Africa, 708 F.2d at 764-66. The
court was unequivocal: "[I]t seems clear that the public places in these airports are far
more akin to such public forums as streets and common areas than they are to such
nonforums as prisons, buses, and military bases." Id. at 764. "Whatever common-sense
differences may exist in the forms of free speech allowable in airports, as opposed to parks
and streets, an unusual consensus of judicial, legislative, and administrative opinion
would classify the public areas of [airports] squarely within the public forum family." Id.
at 766. Indeed, the court cites seven similar airport cases with which it is in accord. See
id. at 764-65. The third of these is Fernandes. The Fernandes court made its holding
clear on the page to which the Gannett court cites: "[]e find that the interior of the
terminals contains areas which are public forums." Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 626.
84. Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d
767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984).
85. 558 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1977).
86. See id. at 68 n.l.
87. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
88. 432 F. Supp. 1263 (D.N.J. 1977).
89. See supra note 15.
90. Moskowitz, 432 F. Supp. at 1266.
91. "No distinction can be wrung for First Amendment purposes between a subway
platform and a public street." People v. St. Claire, 56 Misc. 2d 326, 328, 288 N.Y.S.2d
388, 391 (Crim. Ct. 1968). "The contest for men's minds, the 'free trade in ideas'...
cannot expire upon a subway platform or the First Amendment to our Constitution has
gone partially underground." Id. at 329, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (citation omitted); see also
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Just weeks after the decision was rendered, the Gannett view of sub-
ways as nonpublic fora was criticized in Penthouse International, Ltd. v.
Koch.9 2 "[W]ith all due deference, I cannot understand how the Second
Circuit in Gannett derives authority for the statement that public areas of
the MTA [subway] stations belong in the third Perry category. . .. "I'
The Penthouse court took pains to distinguish Gannett and arrived at its
own theory of subway stations. "I do not read Gannett or its rationale as
requiring me to depart from the clearly established line of authority
which characterizes such public property, thus used, as a designated pub-
lic forum . ... ,94
Thus, there appear to be three views on the status of subway public
areas for first amendment access purposes: subway stations, analogous to
public streets, are traditional public fora;95 subway stations are public
fora by designation; 96 and subway stations are nonpublic fora.97 This
particular confusion has appeared only since Perry. The pre-Perry cases
were basically consistent.98 This confusion results from the first cate-
gory's relative lack of conceptual principles by which it can be rationally
applied to new situations.
As Perry's deficiencies and the conflicts among the lower courts
demonstrate, the public forum doctrine needs answers to this question:
What is it about streets and parks that is conducive to free speech that
does not interfere with the normal use of the property? To answer this
question is to deduce those characteristics of streets, parks and like
places that were influential in arriving at holdings evincing the view that
"streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of informa-
tion and opinion." 99
These are the characteristics that make public fora of streets and
parks. It should be these characteristics that determine whether any
other public property is a public forum. In other words, the test for pub-
lic fora should not be a "laundry list" based on a static view of history, 100
but rather an inquiry into whether a particular public property suffi-
In Re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 851, 434 P.2d 353, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967) ("a
railway station is like a public street").
92. 599 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
93. Id. at 1348.
94. Id. at 1349 (emphasis added); accord Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985); Lebron v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
95. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
99. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
100. See Stone, supra note 8, at 246 n.54; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3460 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Chicago Area
Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
992 (1975).
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ciently embodies the public forum qualities of streets and parks. These
characteristics, then, are the indicia of public fora.
IV. PROPOSAL
This Note proposes five characteristics that, if present in any combina-
tion, strengthen the argument that the particular property is a first cate-
gory public forum: 1) the property is open and spacious; 2) the property
is a public thoroughfare; 3) the property is frequented by many people;
4) the people are present as private citizens, rather than in any official
capacity; and 5) the people are present voluntarily. The following
paragraphs examine the five indicia individually.10'
A. Openness
Since the "streets and parks" cases, courts have been concerned that
public fora should be spacious. 102 A public forum should be relatively
spacious to ensure both the physical and psychological comfort and con-
venience of all users of the property. The assurance of physical conven-
ience is a practical concern: keeping passageways open so that traffic
may flow unobstructed.0 3 There must be ample room for listeners to
101. It should be noted here that the proposed indicia obtain only when access to
public realty is sought. The public forum doctrine has been invoked in trying to gain
access to public personalty. Eg., Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska
1978) (city publication); see also Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971)
(state college newspaper); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex.
1970) (state bar journal). Applying the public forum concept to mandate access to a
public publication presents a host of interesting questions. For example, the Supreme
Court rejected mandatory access to private publications, see Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), but granted such access in the broadcasting context.
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The distinction rested in
large measure on the scarcity of airwaves relative to printing presses. See L. Tribe, supra
note 1, at 697-98. Does the scarcity of government printing presses together with the
public forum notion require mandatory access?
Whatever the application of the public forum doctrine to personalty, the ideas ad-
vanced in this Note are not designed to reach the question.
102. Cf Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("size of a park" is relevant); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941)
(licensing of "open-air public meetings" near public highways cannot be justified on the
grounds of promoting the public convenience). The modem authorities are more explicit.
See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) ("open spaces");
Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir.) ("spa-
cious"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
103. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616-17 (1968); International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1978); Wolin v.
Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); In re
Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 849-50, 434 P.2d 353, 355-56, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99-100 (1967);
see also Solicitation & Leafletting Procedures at Nat'l & Dulles Int'l Airports, 45 Fed.
Reg. 35,314, 35,315-16, 35,319 (1980) (regulations designed to minimize obstructions to
the flow of traffic in airport terminals) (F.A.A. discussion of the final rule); cf Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing the
State's interest in the unobstructed flow of vehicular traffic); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 160 (1939) (giving examples of impermissible obstructions of traffic).
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listen as well as for non-listeners to go about their business. The speech
must not materially interfere with the normal functioning of the prop-
erty.' 04 For example, a speaker should not be permitted to assemble a
crowd near a staircase or doorway. The interiors of buses and trains,
with their single narrow aisles, should also be free of obstruction. 05  In
general, the "openness" characteristic of public fora ensures that a
speaker is not putting the property to a use that is inconsistent with its
normal functioning.
The second function of this indicium, the psychological comfort of all
users of the property, bears on the concern that the audience not be cap-
tive. This notion will be discussed in connection with the "voluntari-
ness" indicium.
B. Thoroughfare
A thoroughfare is a public place, open at both ends, through which
traffic passes. Thus, rather than being a characteristic, this indicium is
more a characterization, a general term encompassing streets, parks,
sidewalks and similar places. It is best understood by pointing out an
often overlooked distinction. The "public" in "public property" refers to
ownership.' 016 The "public" in "public forum" refers to use and occupa-
tion.107 Although the state holds title to a public forum, the state
"seek[s] neither privacy within nor exclusive possession" of the
property.,os
Publicly owned places that are not public thoroughfares-for example
mailboxes or an art gallery-are essentially publicly owned private fora if
fora at all.' 019 Their use is intended exclusively for those privy to the
104. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1968),
overruled on other grounds, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Rosen v. Port of
Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981); cf Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
574 (1941) (upholding restrictions on a street parade because the parade would impede
the normal functioning of the street).
105. Cf Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (transit buses not
open space). But cf Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225,
1232-33 (7th Cir. 1985) (advertising systems of transit authorities are public fora of the
second category without regard to the structure of the space where the ads are located);
Coalition for Abortion Rights v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 584 F. Supp. 985, 989
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
106. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
107. On this distinction, compare Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897)
(discussing public ownership and its attendant powers) with Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S.
496, 515-16 (1939) (excepting from Davis certain property on the basis of the public's use
and occupation of the property).
108. In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 851, 434 P.2d 353, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1967); see also Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972) (per curiam) (street
owned by military base is a public forum because the base has abandoned all claim to its
control).
109. See, e.g., Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir.)
(gallery), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 528 (1985); Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v.
(Vol. 54
PUBLIC FORUM ANAL YSIS AFTER PERRY
property. 1 Any other view would open all publicly owned property to
aspiring speakers without regard to whether the property is open to the
public at large.1 1
Over time, changes in people's locomotive habits have brought corre-
sponding changes in the nature of thoroughfares.' 2 Judge McMillan
noted this change in the context of automobiles:
Publicly owned streets, sidewalks and parks are "historically associ-
ated with the exercise of First Amendment rights" in part because,
historically, those places were where the people were. Handbilling,
soliciting, and speaking in downtown areas could be expected to reach
the great numbers of citizens who shopped and worked there. Unable
to go onto private property, people with a message went to the streets
and sidewalks to spread their word, ultimately deriving First Amend-
ment protection for their activities.
The automobile has radically changed the places where people shop
and otherwise appear in public. In many places downtown streets
have emptied and patronage of suburban shopping centers has swelled.
The new "downtowns". . . are usually privately owned and thus not
accessible as of right to the activities associated with free speech. Peo-
ple en route to the shopping plazas in cars are ordinarily beyond the
practical reach of speech.
Handbillers and solicitors are therefore remitted to the "other simi-
lar public places" that most closely resemble the traditional gathering
places of the people-the parking areas and approaches to state stores
and other public buildings.11 3
In addition to the automobile, advances in air, bus and various forms
of rail travel have given rise to thoroughfares beyond the contemplation
of the founders of the public forum doctrine. Therefore, references to
"traditional" or "historical" public fora ought not require a static histori-
cal view of streets and parks. On the contrary, bus and train terminals
and airports are the streets of modernity. 14 Parking lots are inseparable
Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 1976) (mailboxes). But see Albany Welfare
Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319, 1323 (2d Cir.) (waiting room is a public forum),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
110. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47, 51-53
(1983).
111. Indeed, the absence of the public at large from a particular place precludes appli-
cation of the concepts of public trust and adverse possession (or easement by prescrip-
tion) with which Justice Roberts launched the public forum doctrine. See supra notes 17-
18 and accompanying text.
112. See cases cited in supra notes 31-34.
113. United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (W.D.N.C. 1977)
(citations omitted).
114. See Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 39 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 851, 434 P.2d 353,
356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967).
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adjuncts to modern streets. 1 5 In the final analysis, it is thoroughfares
that are traditionally and historically associated with the exercise of free
speech. Courts should not freeze, for public forum purposes, the concept
of a thoroughfare as it stood in 1939.
C. Populousness
This indicium addresses the practical concern that since speech re-
quires a listener, public speech requires many. The public forum doc-
trine is misapplied if used to guarantee access to a small, predictable
group of listeners.116 For the term public, in the public forum sense,
comprehends a sort of anonymity-at least initially-among the
audience.
Of course, this indicium should not exclude those speakers who ad-
dress individuals, one by one, rather than a group of listeners. The char-
acteristic is measured over time. Thus, many consecutive individual
listeners indicate a public forum as well as does a single large audi-
ence.117 Moreover, the size of the audience should be, of course, relative
to the population of the region in which the forum is located.
"The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach
the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to
win their attention.""' This opportunity requires the right to speak
"where the relevant audience may be found."' 19 To the public speaker,
this means a place that a substantial cross section of the public fre-
quents-a public forum. 2
It must be made clear, however, that a large audience refers to people
who are present, not to viewers of a broadcast or readers of press cover-
age. '2 This limitation prevents abuse of the public forum doctrine by
115. See Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359, 1361-62 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
116. Cf Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 313 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("In
streets and public places, all races and nationalities and all sorts and conditions of men
walk, linger and mingle.").
117. This is the case with those most prolific of modem public forum litigants, Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON). ISKCON has brought over thirty
public forum cases since 1970. See LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file (author's calcula-
tions) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review). This is particularly interesting
in light of Professor Kalven's observation that the Jehovah's Witnesses brought most of
the thirty or so first amendment cases to reach the Supreme Court in the 1930's and
1940's. See Kalven, supra note 3, at I & n.2.
118. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
119. Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968).
120. Cf Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471, 480 (2d
Cir. 1976) (facility not available for general use is not a public forum).
121. Issues concerning access to the media are beyond the scope of this Note. See
supra note 101. The character of the property, the central issue in public forum analysis,
is not, however, changed by the presence of cameras or reporters. If it were, then the
public forum status of a place could change from day to day, indeed, minute to minute.
Such fickle law would be both difficult to apply and easy to circumvent by hiring a cam-
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those who would invoke it to fortify their speech with a dramatic back-
drop. The public forum doctrine affords the bare opportunity to exercise
first amendment rights. It should be beyond both the power and purpose
of the doctrine to bolster the content of speech."z Indeed, such use
would cast the state as an unwitting ally of the speaker. 23 Simply put,
the public forum doctrine must not be allowed to deteriorate into a "pub-
lic backdrop" doctrine.
Thus, military bases, prisons and nuclear power facilities are not pub-
lic fora. 24 The first amendment requires that the state allow citizens the
opportunity to air opinions about these places.' No similar require-
ment exists that the property itself be made available as the stage and
scenery for the speech.
The speaker might rejoin that the military personnel or the nuclear
facility employees are his intended audience. Still, the speaker's recourse
is not access to the military base or the nuclear facility. These places
evince none of the other proposed indicia and are not public fora.
Rather, the speaker should look to the nearest public forum-an adjoin-
ing street, park or other similar place-to reach his audience." 6 Indeed,
this appears to be what the Supreme Court had in mind when ruling that
a public forum "will not lose its historically recognized character for the
reason that it abuts goverment property that has been dedicated to a use
other than as a forum for public expression."'' 27
D. Private Capacity
A public forum is an assembly of people in their private capacities. 21
The operative distinction is between people on public property for private
era crew. The better view is that a place is either a public forum or not and only funda-
mental changes in its character can change its status.
122. Cf Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The doc-
trine of the public forum achieves a central purpose of the freedom of speech-the goal of
equality of communicative opportunity--by opening avenues of expression for the 'poorly
financed causes of little people.' ") (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146
(1943)); United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359, 1361-62 (W.D.N.C.
1977) (discussing the importance of non-media speech).
123. Cf Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) ("[T]he military as such is insulated
from both the reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political
causes or candidates.").
124. See, e.g., id. at 838 (military base); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966)
(prison); Knolls Action Project v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 771 F.2d 46, 50 (2d
Cir. 1985) (nuclear power facility).
125. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the free-
dom of speech.").
126. In fact, this is exactly what the plaintiff in Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d
83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968), was permitted to do to reach his audience
of military personnel.
127. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
128. Despite its paradoxical ring, the idea that listeners be present in their private
capacities is a central concern of the public forum doctrine. See, for example, the pains-
taking line drawing exercise in Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319,
1323-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
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purposes, 129 and those on public property to carry on business for or with
the state. 130 In the latter case, the state is, in a sense, coercing the lis-
tener's presence.' The official business of the state should not be used
to assemble a speaker's audience. 32 For, as has been noted, the public
forum doctrine assures access to property, not to public employees or
people having business with the state.
Just as the state must not be required to bolster the content of speech
by providing a backdrop, 33 it must not be required to guarantee the
speaker an audience, 131 for in both cases the state would be actively aid-
ing the speaker's cause.' 35 Thus, the reception area of a social services
office, 136 teachers' mailboxes 137 and ticket lines at transportation termi-
nals 13 are probably ineligible for public forum status. In sum, the public
forum doctrine is not meant to ally the state with the speaker, but only to
ensure the state's tolerance of the speaker's activities. 
139
E. Voluntariness
Freedom to receive information is the corollary of the freedom to
129. Examples of private purposes include recreation and travel.
130. See, e.g., Rhoads v. McFerran, 517 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1975) (public or private
nature of forum may turn on the capacity of individuals engaged in the speech as well as
the capacity in which the audience is present). Examples of people on public property to
carry out business for or with the state include public employees and recipients of free
cheese.
131. It can be argued that people in the streets are in their public capacity as travelers
on public thoroughfares. Thus, the state would be assembling the speaker's audience
simply by providing public streets. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). This argument, however, goes too far, for the State coerces the
presence of street travelers in only a nominal sense because they are transient. Public
employees in the workplace and those transacting official business with them are present
for a relatively longer time. The difference is that the street affords the speaker a mere
opportunity to reach an audience while the workplace would actually secure an audience.
See New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F. 2d 718, 722 (2d
Cir. 1984).
132. Cf Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit v. Phillips, 381 F. Supp. 644, 646
(M.D.N.C. 1974) ("The State is not required to provide plaintiffs with a special forum in
order to advocate their views."). See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 51-53 & n.10 (1983) (discussing the incompatability of public
forum status with a place used to communicate official business).
133. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
134. Cf Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Community School, 457
F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1972) (first amendment "provides no guarantee that a speech will
persuade or that advocacy will be effective").
135. See New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718,
723 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. See New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718,
722-23 (2d Cir. 1984). But see Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319,
1322-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
137. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
138. See In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 847, 434 P.2d 353, 354, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 98
(1967); see also Solicitation & Leafletting Procedures at Nat'l & Dulles Int'l Airports, 45
Fed. Reg. 35,314, 35,315-19 (1980) (F.A.A. discussion of the final rule).
139. See Kalven, supra note 3, at 2.
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speak."4° This freedom of the listener necessarily includes the liberty to
choose what information to receive. 41  The public forum doctrine has
long taken account of the listener's rights through its concern that the
audience not be captive. 14
2
While [a speaker] clearly has a right to express his views to those who
wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience
incapable of declining to receive it. . . . [T]he right of commuters to
be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from
transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the
dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience.1
4 3
Riding in a bus or other form of transportation is not the only way an
audience can be rendered captive. For instance, in the case of oral com-
munication, everyone within earshot of the speech is somewhat captive.
Unlike eyes, nose and mouth, ears cannot be shut. Such a broad view of
captivity, however, encroaches too far on the first amendment protec-
tions. The better view of captivity turns on the listener's freedom to re-
move himself from earshot. 44 This ability must likewise not be
interpreted in the extreme. Strictly speaking, only the incarcerated and
the infirm are unable to get themselves out of earshot. Yet theirs is not
the only captivity with which the public forum doctrine sympathizes.
Captivity, for first amendment purposes, is best phrased as the inability
to get out of earshot without having to go out of one's way.
Under this view, doorways, turnstiles and "bottlenecks" of any kind
render an audience captive.145 Similarly, any place where people must
stand in a line makes for a captive audience.' 46 A speaker should not be
allowed to use a public forum to hold an audience captive. More accu-
rately, a place within earshot of people who are "captive" should not be
considered a public forum.
These five indicia are not sine qua non of public fora. The indicia are
offered as a flexible guide to recognizing public fora and distinguishing
them from other settings. The more of these indicia that coexist in a
particular case, the stronger the argument that the property is a tradi-
140. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
141. This notion was implicit in some of the early "street and parks" cases. See, e.g.,
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (qualifying the speaker's right to
free speech with the listener's "desir[e] to receive it"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
160 (1939) (giving examples of how the speaker's rights are circumscribed by the lis-
tener's rights).
142. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
143. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
144. Cf New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 715,
722 (2d Cir. 1984) (welfare recipients could not leave waiting room to avoid solicitors);
International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th
Cir. 1978) (passengers on line become "part of captive audience").
145. See Solicitation & Leafletting Procedures at Nat'l & Dulles Int'l Airports, 45 Fed.
Reg. 35,314, 35,315-19 (1980) (F.A.A. discussion of the final rule). See supra note 144.
146. See supra note 144.
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tional public forum. Conversely, the absence of one or more of the indi-
cia militates against public forum status.
CONCLUSION
Courts have long acknowledged that the question of whether a particu-
lar property is a public forum turns on the character of the property. 147
Yet neither court nor scholar has ever tried to distill characteristics of
property which are indicative of a public forum. Rather, the public fo-
rum doctrine has developed into little more than a "laundry list" of types
of property. Because static lists are unresponsive to the changing uses of
public property, there have been inconsistent results when courts were
asked to apply the doctrine to "unlisted" types of property. Without a
conceptual approach to the public forum doctrine, courts lack the neces-
sary tools for applying that doctrine to newly emerging types of public
property. Proper judicial use of the characteristics proposed in this Note
as indicia of public fora would help solve this problem.
Peter Jakab
147. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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